Introduction
The spatial development of knowledge is of enduring interest to scholars of economic geography and international business (Wood and Reynolds, 2011) . In particular the process of innovation and its engagement of dispersed networks provides an important basis for the creation of competitive advantage both at the firm and the regional level (Bessant et al., 2012, Jenkins and Tallman, 2010) . The globalization of the world economy has shifted the focus of knowledge development away from the local to concern for knowledge transfers over what are often long distances (Bathelt and Henn, 2014) . A variety of studies have addressed the flow of technology across borders (Feinberg and Gupta, 2004; Almeida et al., 2002) , often by considering changes in patenting patterns (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Almeida et al., 2002; Feinberg and Gupta, 2004) . They typically consider how different relational architectures might influence the ease and impact of technology transfer. Thus, Kogut (1991) discusses how national technological patterns limit the movement of tacit knowledge internationally, Feinberg and Gupta (2004) show that technical knowledge moves more easily between multinational firms that have similar national backgrounds, and Almeida et al. (2002) show that patentable knowledge moves more easily in alliances than through markets and more easily within firms than in alliances. Bathelt and Cohendet (2014) propose that the interweaving of local and global knowledge dimensions result in channeling knowledge through cross-national feedback loops.
However, the mechanisms and processes of transferring the complex, tacit, path dependent organization capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) or architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark 1990 ) that provide long term competitive advantage are not generally 3 addressed, or are seen as extremely difficult to pursue (Kogut, 1991; Szulanski, 1996; Tallman and Phene, 2007) . Indeed, architectural or systemic knowledge is seen as both organizationally and geographically sticky (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Saxenian, 1994; Tallman et al., 2004) . Architectural knowledge is path dependent, built up over time through idiosyncratic learning experiences not easily identified or assembled and therefore is highly immobile. The embedded nature of this knowledge makes changes, particularly directed and intentional changes, problematic even among geographically separated subunits of a firm, much less when it has been imported from another organization. Rather, when challenged by foreign competitors with new and superior architectural understandings of the relevant system, firms initially fail to grasp the new 'way of the world', redouble their efforts at pursuing old ideas more efficiently under old understandings, and eventually fail (Christensen, 1997) . The implication for economic geography is that in the face of such competency traps among constituent firms, regional clusters too eventually will collapse (Pouder and St. John, 1996) .
However, there are examples of firms that have undergone systemic change, usually under conditions of near-failure, and have emerged as changed entities that have become very successful. Changing the nature of the firm occurs mostly in crisis situations when there is little to lose by rejecting the current architecture and attempting to shift to a new conceptualization of the basis for advantage. IBM was changed by an outsider CEO from a manufacturer of computers to an IT services and consulting firm that does a bit of manufacturing on the side (Gerstner, 2003) . Apple was near collapse when Steve Jobs was rehired and transformed personal computing, music and personal communication by restructuring the company to a new model that overwhelmed more entrenched and divisionalized competitors; competitors that are now struggling to adapt to the new structures imposed on their industries by Apple (Young and Simon, 2005) . This paper focuses on a firm that successfully renewed its organizational architecture by importing knowledge from a foreign cluster in the same industry when the required capabilities were not available locally (Bathelt and Cohendet, 2014) . It explores the mechanisms that permit and enhance the movement of highly tacit component (technical) knowledge and even of very geographically sticky architectural knowledge across borders and between clusters and firms. In doing so, it addresses a number of critical research questions that relate to intra-and inter-locational knowledge transfer. First, we consider what eventualities motivate firms to look for complex technologies or new organizational routines and capabilities both locally and inter-regionally or internationally. We see competitive pressures from other firms driving the search for knowledge, but this then leads us to our second question, which is to understand when and how a firm decides to import technical or component knowledge and when it shifts to seeking new architectural knowledge -new routines and processes for engaging in this competition. Third, we seek improved understanding of methods of transmitting such knowledge to include accessing local knowledge in foreign locations, attracting knowledgeable individuals from other locations and firms as change agents, and restructuring the core architectural characteristics of the focal firm.
We use a theory driven, longitudinal, single-case study to demonstrate that indeed the 'organizational context', the firm's architectural understanding of its core processes, can be changed by importing architectural knowledge from other firms in distant locations. We develop a conceptual framework to examine and describe how shifting the geography of knowledge sourcing can facilitate architectural change by following the transformation of one business unit within a specialist global organization, Ferrari Gestione Sportiva (FGS), through a series of evolutionary steps that involved internalizing new component knowledge from other firms and locations, transforming the company's architectural knowledge through various transactions with firms and individuals from a foreign cluster, and eventually transforming the concept of the firm and its focus radically. These combine to provide a conceptual framework for knowledge transformation that is explored through the analysis of individuals interacting with a single firm, but which offers parallels to the roles played by multinational firms tapping into and internalizing location-specific component and architectural knowledge from various locations. We close by generalizing this model to address the fundamental processes of organizational learning at various levels.
Knowledge and knowledge transfer among firms and clusters
Industrial clusters are "geographically proximate groups of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities" according to Porter (2000, 16) . These clusters are often sources of innovative technologies and processes for an industry. However, although Porter's (2000) framing of the cluster concept within the notion of regional competitive advantage has gained much popular support, there are concerns relating to lack of theoretical grounding to provide the basis for understanding and identifying the underpinning mechanisms that create such regional capability (Martin & Sunley, 2003) .
Clusters depend on the localized conditions that stimulate economic transformation such as a confluence of private, public and quasi-public structures often framed as institutional thickness (Amin & Thrift, 2005; Henry & Pinch 2001) . In this context, place and spatial proximity are the key foundations of a socially embedded network of relationships that enhance trust and knowledge generation and are therefore able to stimulate greater levels of innovation and economic transformation (Granovetter 1973) . Such regional agglomerations are not unitary in their capabilities but are sustained by a related variety of competences and complementary sectors (Boschma & Iammarino, 2009 ). This geographical lens views the economic and social processes from a spatial perspective, and although it emphasizes the embedded, path dependent nature of these processes, it also recognizes that agents such as organizations make choices which may create shifts and transformations from these particular paths (Bathelt & Gluckler, 2011) .
Within the body of work on clusters there has been a recognition of the importance of distilling the nature of knowledge creation in agglomerations and attempting to isolate the mechanisms which lead to firm learning and innovation (Malmberg & Maskell, 2002) .
One perspective for considering the movement of knowledge among firms within clusters and between firms across cluster boundaries utilizes the concepts of component and architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990) . Pinch et al. (2003, 379) describe component knowledge, which "…refers to those specific knowledge resources, skills and technologies that relate to identifiable parts of an organizational system, rather than to the whole. Component knowledge is therefore normally tied to the technology and operating norms of particular industrial sectors." For example, component knowledge in building racing cars may be very explicit, such as the design and use of shock absorbers, pistons, turbochargers, and other parts, or much more complex and tacit, such as the use of aerodynamic design principles or exhaust layouts. However, it is often tied to scientific and engineering principles and can be measured, codified, and transferred to other informed individuals and organizations. tend to be limited to component knowledge that fits within the existing framework of channels and filters; information that might lead to changing the architectural framework is largely filtered out. Specific communication channels and effective filters allow an organization to cope with complexity by keeping information intakes limited and structured so that it is not constantly recreating its organizational 'dominant logic' (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986 ) in response to random contextual variation. However, this same process tends to prevent the firm from identifying fundamental disruptive change and exposes it to the risk of building core rigidities for itself (Leonard-Barton, 1992 ).
Thus, architectural knowledge becomes implicit in the organization, and problemsolving strategies are framed in the context of the existing architecture. Problem-solving strategies tend to focus on improving efficiency at existing tasks/technologies, filtering out supposedly irrelevant component knowledge to focus on easing absorption of the relevant. Henderson and Clark (1990, 27) say that, "We have assumed that architectural knowledge embedded in routines and channels becomes inert and hard to change. Future research designed to investigate information filters, problem-solving strategies and communication channels in more detail could explore the extent to which this could be avoided." These concepts have been taken forward at the micro-level in addressing some of the specific problems of knowledge moving across boundaries of different working groups in an automotive setting (Carlile, 2004; Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) . Our focus here, however, is to consider the explicit spatial aspects in the nature of these flows.
The limits to knowledge transfer across geographic distance
Given that architectures for knowledge flow management develop in all organizations in order to make fundamentally chaotic environments comprehensible, certain currently accepted general rules of knowledge transfer can be described. First, highly tacit architectural knowledge is essentially very difficult to transfer, often described as 'sticky' (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tallman et al., 2004) . As it develops through practice and experiential learning, with strong path dependency, and as all organizations, firms, or clusters have different experiences, none will develop identical architectural knowledge (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . Further, all human systems have some architectural concepts, and existing architectural knowledge provides filters to resist the import of alternative systemic architectures. Second, while component knowledge is transferred more easily, it moves even more quickly among organizations that have higher absorptive capacities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) for each other's technical know-how due to their common architectural frameworks, or sets of channels, filters, and problem solving strategies. Due both to accessibility and to absorptive advantage related to common architectural knowledge (Tallman et al., 2004) , knowledge search and exchange tend to be local and incremental (Zucker et al., 1998) .
Thus, new ideas move more quickly and clearly within firms than between firms, and more quickly and clearly among firms within a geographical knowledge cluster than across cluster boundaries, and similarly faster within a nation than across borders (Kogut, 1991; Tallman and Phene, 2007) . Therefore, performance differences can persist between clusters, if one cluster-level architectural framework provides a more competitive framework than others, and within clusters, if one firm has superior private architectural knowledge to others. Over time, competitive pressures cause firms to incorporate new component knowledge, though their unique architectures may apply it differently, and also to attempt to develop new architectural knowledge. However, such efforts are difficult, lengthy, and uncertain due to the tacit and embedded nature of architectural knowledge that makes copying other architectures or even directed internal development of innovative architectural knowledge uncertain at best.
Architectural knowledge is embedded in the structure and information processes of established organizations or clusters of organizations, and therefore these organizations struggle to recognize and respond to threats from innovations in architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990) . Path dependency suggests that a firm's experience with an evolving technology shapes its architectural knowledge to reflect an organizational dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) , dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) or technological trajectory (Jenkins and Floyd, 2001) 1 . Once a particular product design architecture becomes accepted as dominant, change and development tend to be focused on component areas, while the architecture behind the product or technology becomes taken for granted. Similarly, when a particular organizational logic is accepted and standardized, top management use this logic to address all organizational issues (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) , management learning focusing on new component areas rather than new architectures. The consequence is that incumbent firms tend to be displaced in instances of disruptive change to which they cannot adapt (Christensen, 1997) and clusters of firms eventually become so enmeshed in internal knowledge flows and intra-cluster competition that they fail to respond to superior innovation from external sources (Pouder and St. John, 1996) .
We consider that these issues are particularly difficult in international industries, where firms are separated by geographical space and also by differences in cluster-level 1 Prahalad and Bettis (1986: 490) use 'dominant logic' to describe the "way in which managers conceptualize the business and make critical resource allocation decisions…". Abernathy and Utterback (1978) use 'dominant design' to describe standardization of product design on a set of common attributes across a product category. We will use 'dominant logic' to describe architectural knowledge at the organizational level and 'dominant design' in reference to the architecture of technical knowledge about the racing car itself. architectural knowledge and national-level institutional differences (Tallman and Phene, 2007) ; what could be referred to as differences in place (Lorenzen et al., 2012) . There is an extensive literature describing the international transfer of knowledge (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) , but most of it focuses on the transfer of technology or component knowledge. Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) propose the idea that alliances and/or the transfer of individuals may increase technological exchange by some process of increasing contextual similarity. However, their results from an empirical test of secondary data are not supportive of the idea of importing context. Szulanski (1996) and Kogut and Zander (1993) describe and demonstrate the difficulties of moving highly tacit knowledge across borders, even within firms. Kogut (1991) suggests that moving complex knowledge across borders is very slow and difficult except within a multinational firm -and even then is difficult due to cultural and institutional (what might be considered national-level architectural knowledge or dominant logic) differences. Moving tacit, embedded, contextually sticky architectural knowledge internationally from a cluster in one country to a firm (in another cluster) in another country is near impossible -or so the majority of models insist (Markusen, 1999) . However, as rare as it may be that a firm is able to undergo the process of reconstructing its organizational architecture, we propose that this process does occur, could occur more frequently, and would be of great value to incumbent organizations if it were expressed in a generalized framework. The remainder of this paper uses the case of Ferrari Gestione Sportiva (FGS) to examine how architectural knowledge develops in a firm based in a geographical cluster, how it interacts with knowledge embedded in another cluster in a distant location, and how an architectural framework can be recreated under conditions of extreme competitive pressures when faced with alternative successful architectures. We observe the process of architectural development and evolution in FGS over the period and derive a conceptual model of the mechanisms underlying the import of architectural knowledge. It is important to note that FGS had only a limited sense of what it was trying to accomplish in renewing and restructuring its knowledge base -indeed, many of what will be seen as critical decisions were driven by expediency or individual preferences unrelated to, even seemingly destructive of, successful knowledge transfer. We argue that the planned and unplanned process followed by Ferrari reflects concepts from learning theory, however, and finish by presenting a conceptual model for cross-border architectural knowledge transfer.
The case study

The case method and industry context
The research in this paper follows a longitudinal, multistage case study design (Yin 1984; Leonard-Barton, 1990 ). It focuses on major periods in the history of Ferrari's racing operations. Ferrari has one of the most successful global brands in the automotive industry, regularly appearing in global brand rankings (e.g. Interbrand, 2013) . Key aspects of their brand strength are sporting heritage and reputation. We chart their progression in the sporting arena from a locally focused specialist car manufacturer to a globally dominant operation that is now the most successful in the history of Formula 1 (F1) motorsport. We use a theoretical sampling approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) to focus on this organization. Our approach can be described as a multilevel comparative analysis in that we consider the organization at both the architectural and component levels, making comparisons across different time periods (Burgelman, 2002) . Our approach is to move beyond the descriptive and to use qualitative research to develop theory, but we do so with an explicit recognition of prior concepts and relationships (Birkinshaw et al., 2011) . We apply Henderson and Clark's (1990) concept of architectural and component knowledge as a framing for our interrogation of the case material through the areas of activity they identify as supporting existing architectural knowledge: communication channels, filters and problem-solving strategies. We also specifically focus on variations in the spatial aspects of the firm, most notably the location of facilities and partnerships during these periods (Jenkins and Tallman, 2010) . We use this interrogation of the case data to generate a series of propositions that delineate the changes involved in developing component and architectural knowledge and the potential importance of localization in this process.
Ferrari is chosen because it demonstrates transitions through periods of environmental change and also, as our theoretical lens focuses on shifts in architectural knowledge, is the one firm which has survived through a series of changes in the dominant design of the F1 racing car. F1 racing itself offers strong evidence of geographical clustering of architectural and component knowledge (Jenkins and Tallman, 2010) and established standards of design and performance (Jenkins, 2010) . Our selection of respondents is purposeful, as we have sought to explore the technical shifts and strategic changes that were made during this period. Table 1 provides a summary of the respondents, their roles and their affiliations. As Table 1 Although the focus of the interviews did not specifically concern the geographic aspects of the company strategy, the broader focus on competitive performance and the reasons behind this created a rich picture from which the geographic dimensions emerged as a key construct in the ability of the organization to both develop and change its approach to innovation. Part of the discussion in the interviews necessarily focused on past events that often allowed a more open reflection on causal dynamics than would be the case with contemporary accounts (Hargadon and Yellowlees, 2001 ). All of the interviews were fully transcribed and the transcriptions analyzed in detail through the framework outlined in Table 1 .
We also accessed a wide range of secondary data sources including autobiographies and biographies of key players, and a range of specialist motorsport magazines that had been published since the 1950s. These are outlined in Table 2 . The use of a wide variety of secondary data enable such recollections to be checked against contemporaneous events to ensure that as comprehensive picture as possible is developed. Table 3 represents two key aspects of the industry and spatial context. First, it lists the key areas of component knowledge within the design and development of F1 racing cars. These component areas are taken from an engineering forum for motorsport technologies and so represent particular technological elements and knowledge domains that are required for the creation of these specialist vehicles. Second, it distinguishes between the architectural characteristics of two key geographically agglomerating regions -'Motor Valley' in Emilia Romagna (www.motorvalley.com), an area in northern Italy around Milan and Bologna, which includes the city of Modena, and the area known as 'Motorsport Valley' in the UK which represents a crescent area to the north, west and south of London (www.the-mia.com/The-Industry). Both of these areas have been identified as demonstrating the distinctive capabilities of global clusters, with the British cluster receiving detailed consideration in the economic geography literature (Henry et al., 1996; Henry and Pinch, 1999; Pinch and Henry, 1999) .
In the case of the Italian region, motor racing developed in the 1930s led by Alfa Romeo of Milan who had recruited Enzo Ferrari to run their racing department in Modena.
At that time motor racing was dominated by long distance racing on public roads with events such as France's Le Mans and Italy's Mille Miglia. With Italy's aerospace sector effectively dismantled following World War 2, and a focus on high-speed public road races, the post war focus was to privilege the engine as the source of competitive performance.
This meant that the firms active in Motor Valley in the 1950s -Ferrari, Alfa Romeo, Maserati and Lancia -all focused on engine development, with their technical managers all coming from a background of engine design. This created a horizontally based agglomeration cluster with a particular view on the primacy of knowledge domains. This leads to the inference in Table 3 , that the architectural knowledge of the Italian region was focused first and foremost on engine development.
In contrast, the British cluster had developed in the 1950s through small light cars designed to compete on closed circuits, often disused airfields -such as RAF Silverstonethat provided tarmac surfaces for racing. This racing culture developed in the same region as an ongoing, but diminishing, aerospace cluster that provided a source of scientists and engineers in areas such as materials and aerodynamics and also unique facilities such as wind tunnels for testing designs. In contrast to the Italians, the British designs focused on making the cars agile rather than powerful, with an emphasis on the development of the chassis (Chapman, 1958) and later on the application of aerodynamics. In the early 1950s, the Italian region dominated Formula 1. However, after a series of accidents involving fatalities among spectators in the mid and late 1950s, racing on public roads became restricted and the focus shifted to using compact, closed circuits, which played to the strengths of the British designers. (Colombo, 1985, 16) . The term 'fifteen-hundred' refers to the engine capacity in cubic centimeters of grand prix cars at the time -note that the discussion starts with a clear focus on the engine. (Colombo, 1985, 16) . The Ferrari 125 (so named as the capacity of each of its twelve cylinders was 125cc) made its race debut on 11 May 1947, at the Piacenza circuit in Emiliano-Romagnolo.
-------------------------------------------
The case of Ferrari Gestione
The chassis of the car was made of tubular steel, the conventional approach during this time and was fabricated by chassis specialists GILCO Autotelaio in Milan (Colombo, 1985) .
The emerging architectural knowledge of Ferrari is therefore focused on the design of the engine as the central component of the system, as Ferrari noted in his autobiography:
"In fact I have always given great importance to the engine and much less to the chassis, endeavoring to squeeze as much power as possible in the conviction that it is engine power which is -not 50 per cent but 80 per cent -responsible for success on the track." (Ferrari, 1963, 41-42) .
At that time it was usual to produce both a single seat 'monoposto' and twin seat 'gran turismo' version, with bodies built by specialist bodybuilders such as Pininfarina, in the (Ferrari, 1963, 145-146) .
In summary, we see a philosophy of car design that focused primarily on the design of the engine, with the other elements being very much secondary, and frequently outsourced to local, specialist contractors. As is generally presented to be the case for geographical clusters of firms, the knowledge needed to develop this process was all held within the localized area of Milan, Bologna and Modena, with Ferrari gradually absorbing and enacting the consensus architectural framework of the Italian Motor Valley cluster, the technical and social interactions -in the Italian tradition the engineers who worked together also spent many of their evenings dining and socializing together -within this small region came to define an Italian approach to Formula 1 racing. Agnelli of Fiat, Ferrari negotiated the take-over of Lancia designs, which then were integrated into the Ferrari racecars (see Figure 1) . Maserati too succumbed to financial pressures and withdrew from racing in 1957 (Nye, 1993) , effectively creating a shift in the North Italian cluster from a horizontal agglomeration of competing firms to a vertical configuration (Markusen, 1999) focused around Ferrari and their supply chain. However, towards the end of the 1950s the English constructors emerged as a competitive threat, led by father and son Charles and John Cooper (Beck-Burridge and Walton, 2000) . The Cooper was a small, light racecar that had been originally developed for racing in junior formula, such as Formula 2, using chassis components taken from the Fiat Topolino car (Nye, 1993) .
In contrast to Ferrari's 'engine centric' architecture, the design of the Cooper focused on the chassis and maximizing the grip of the wheels. Unlike Ferrari, they did not build their own engine, but used an adapted fire pump engine built by Coventry Climax in the UK (Couldwell, 2003) . A key part of the Cooper design was that the engine sat immediately behind the driver -known as a mid-engine layout -thereby giving the car better weight distribution and reducing overall weight by removing the need for a long heavy transmission, as was necessary with the front engine Ferraris (Lawrence, 1998) . Figure 1) . Although the move of the engine to behind the driver could be seen as a shift in architectural knowledge, in many ways it was not, as the design process was still rooted in the 'engine-frame-body' logic of Ferrari. The focus of the design was a new V6 engine and the car still used the tubular chassis concept that was used in the Ferrari 125 back in 1948. Indeed, even the car's '156' nomenclature was due to the engine configuration of 1.5 litres, 6 cylinders.
However, Ferrari's success during 1961 was soon forgotten as a new chassis design was pioneered by UK constructor Lotus. Up to this point the dominant design had been the tubular 'space-frame' chassis, with the structure formed from welded steel tubes. Founder and technical brains behind Lotus Racing, Colin Chapman, had followed Cooper's route into F1. Chapman was exploring a way to both improve the rigidity of the chassis and overcome the difficult task of fabricating aluminum fuel tanks to sit inside the space-frame structure.
The problem solving approach they followed was to redesign the chassis and replace the tubes with box-sections that would provide increased rigidity with the fuel carried within them in rubber bags (Nye, 1993) . This innovation -the monocoque chassis -was incorporated into the Lotus 25 of 1962 and marked a major shift in chassis technology. It was not until 1964, some two seasons after the launch of the Lotus 25, that Ferrari responded with a car which used some of the concepts of the monocoque chassis, although these were still based around the tubular structure, with stress-bearing aluminum sheets shaped and riveted over the tubes known as 'skinned space-frames' (Nye, 1993 ). Ferrari's designs at this time were essentially stop-gap while they developed a new engine to respond to the regulation change for the 1966 season when the engine size would be increased from 1.5 to 3.0 litres. (Tremayne, 2001, 144 Although it did not meet with Forghieri's approval, the move to use a British contractor to produce a chassis, albeit designed by Ferrari, was a major step away from their existing component knowledge in the area of chassis fabrication. This and earlier steps illustrate an important shift in Ferrari's focus for sources of competitive advantage. Having been clearly out-performed by the Cooper mid-engine and the Lotus chassis innovations, they made attempts to imitate successful designs, but only within their existing architecture of the space frame chassis. This accords with Henderson and Clark's (1990) notion that successful incumbents may not grasp the full significance of innovations that are based upon a different architecture. In this case we see Ferrari's partial response -the skinned space frame and outsourcing of the fabrication of the chassis -to the monocoque chassis developed from the distinct 'chassis-body-engine' architecture of the UK cluster, as exemplified by Cooper and Lotus.
Proposition 2: As competitive pressures become significant, firm problem solving will seek new component knowledge but will fit it into existing firm-and cluster-level architectural concepts. Component knowledge may be modeled on perceptions of foreign technology, but information filtering will tend to adapt technical advances to make them compatible with pre-conceived architectural and existing component knowledge, typically failing to provide the intended improvement in performance.
This outcome is particularly likely for knowledge sourced from other clusters with alternative architectural knowledge biases.
Forghieri's focus had been on developing his own design of engine, the Boxer 'Flat 12', a twelve cylinder engine with the cylinders horizontal to the ground, giving it a very low centre of gravity. The fact that the engine was a 12 cylinder (and so mirroring the first Ferrari) meant that it was also capable of producing greater levels of power than the eight cylinder Ford Cosworth. The 312T (312 representing 3.0 litre, 12 cylinder) -was developed around this engine and focused on making the most of its low and wide profile, which made it both powerful and aerodynamically effective. With this car, and a succession of evolutionary versions, Ferrari were able to dominate the period from 1974 through to 1979.
However the success of the 312T resulted in more radical attempts by the competition to find a way round the Ferrari's superiority. This came, once more, from Lotus, who had pioneered a new aerodynamic design that used the air flowing under the car to create a low pressure area to suck the car onto the track. Racing driver Mario Andretti described the Lotus 78 as being 'painted on the road' (Crombac, 2001, 284) . Ferrari again needed to look to new ways to restore their success on the racetrack. Barnard left Ferrari at the end of his three-year contract that expired on 31 October 1989.
He was replaced by Argentine Enrique Scalabroni. (Motorsport, August 1989, 773) , but Barnard's absence was short-lived and he returned in 1992 to continue the UK operation. An important change to the effort to incorporate the British architectural knowledge into FGS took place during this period. It was recognized that the current operational responsibilities of the Technical Director must be pursued in Italy. The regional effect is emphasized by the fact that it was not Barnard and his operation that was transplanted into Maranello, but a new operation was built up by another group of technical specialists who had been located in the British cluster. Ross Brawn was able to bring an entire team from the British cluster, which offered a level of support for architectural change that was not available before. This final stage in the development of the evolution of FGS meant that the differing channels, filters and problem solving approaches which had necessarily evolved in the different locations now had to be integrated through co-location. It was only this final phase that allowed the development of the new architecture that was essentially a hybrid of old and new brought together in one location through a new management team. The key transition for FGS was the step to embed in the British cluster. It appears that most firms, and most clusters, faced with an emergent architectural logic that offers consistently superior performance become mired in seeking solutions in new component technologies grafted onto the established or dominant logic architecture of the firm (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Christensen, 1997) . Sticking with success by reinforcing current architectural knowledge and engaging primarily in local search for new component knowledge is easy to understand, but is the mechanism that creates the inertia which drives the ultimate failure of firms and clusters (Pouder and St. John, 1996) . Cycling through multiple iterations of such a process leads firms into capability traps where increasing levels of investment only raise the cost of eventual competitive failure (Leonard-Barton, 1992) .
Ferrari, however, discovered the key insight that the British constructors had a superior concept for building a racecar, and determined to incorporate this knowledge into their design process. In the case of Ferrari, the mythical status of Enzo Ferrari allowed him to make and enforce the decision to locate in the UK Motorsport Valley. His competitive drive overcame his preconceptions of what made for a competitive racecar, and his status within the firm enforced structural changes that were very much foreign to the old logic of FGS.
Discussion and Conclusions
From the case, we have developed process logic for the specifics of knowledge transformation in Ferrari Gestione Sportiva (FGS). We have acknowledged that other firms have successfully transformed their dominant logic, though it seems a comparatively rare occurrence. We propose a model that could be applied generally by firms faced with a competitive challenge from another region to their architectural understanding of their industry sector to suggest, with reference to the structural solutions derived from the FGS experience, a systematic approach to a competitive solution and to an analytical framework. This is the realm of benchmarking local, regional and national competition, using established communication channels and problem solving approaches. New ideas from other regions are tried, but typically are drastically modified to fit the existing architectural knowledge.
At a later stage, international competition, whether attacking the home market or in foreign markets, is recognized and its component knowledge is added to the mix. As with local component knowledge, adaptation is likely, but in this case the gulf between dominant logics (architectural knowledge pools) suggests complete misunderstanding of how the new technical know-how is incorporated in the system is likely. Bingham and Davis (2012) describe various learning sequences, but find that firms often struggle unsuccessfully with changing processes to admit knowledge from low-status locations even in the face of admitted failure.
If, however, due to the continued superior performance of foreign competitors or to discontinuities in the external environment, the organization is unable to provide sufficient performance enhancement through development of component knowledge and faces competitive failure, then the double-loop effect (the right hand, or restructured dominant logic, loop in Figure 2 ) may occur. This is the point at which the imagination of most incumbent firms appears to fail, and additional non-productive journeys around the left hand loop are taken, following the old logic but to ever less benefit. For the uniquely thoughtful or lucky firm that recognizes the need for fundamental process change, our framework suggests that geography can play a critical role in the evolution of architectural knowledge within the firm. This is because the regionally embedded nature of architectural knowledge (Tallman et al., 2004) means that firms can only change their internal architectural knowledge -their dominant logics -through disassociating themselves from their 'old' regional or cluster architectural knowledge. We also demonstrate that the clusterrelatedness of architectural knowledge makes identification, if not incorporation, of the potential source of new knowledge obvious to industry insiders. However, final incorporation of an alternative architecture requires eventual reconnection back to their roots, their original logic, to create a hybrid architectural knowledge based on a dialectic recombination of the old and new (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993) .
In this sense we are suggesting that development of architectural knowledge is both evolutionary and highly path dependent (Henderson and Clark, 1990) , but that geography provides a mechanism by which firms can identify, access and eventually incorporate unique architectural knowledge, engendering new evolutionary paths and levels of performance. These implications go beyond the level of the firm, and suggest that clusters may transform architectural knowledge through such pathways of reconfiguration. In this sense the vertical cluster centered on FGS in Northern Italy became transformed by the incorporation of architectural knowledge from the horizontal cluster in Britain's Motorsport Valley. However, the hybrid architectural knowledge that developed in the Northern Italian region was distinctive in that it amalgamated both the engine-centric and the chassis/aero-centric knowledge of the two regions to create a new architecture of knowledge not easily replicated by those firms in the British cluster.
Firms do initially learn from the spillovers and comparisons that they can gain from their local cluster (Maskell, 2001 ), but the common architectural knowledge and limited technological innovation inherent to local component knowledge will eventually lead the cluster and its firms into a downward performance spiral (Pouder and St. John, 1996) . We find that an expansive view of the geography of learning is essential to fundamental change at the firm and cluster level, as difficult as this is to accomplish. Foreign locations provide much greater variation in component and architectural knowledge. The first of these suggests the potential gain, while the second suggests the potential difficulty of foreign learning, but at some point it seems to become essential. What foreign clusters do offer are specific target locations for learning: FGS knew that the English "Motorsport Valley" was the source of chassis and aerodynamic technology, so that any effort to incorporate such knowledge could at least be targeted appropriately (Henry et al., 1996) .
Studying alternative foreign locations and the interplay between them may also provide benefits to scholars hoping to understand the evolution of clusters and regions.
Persistent, distinguishable architectural knowledge can develop at the regional level, hence the Italian focus on the engine as the key to a winning racecar, contrasted for decades with the English focus on the design and materials of the chassis for the same purpose. If initial conditions can be determined through a comparison across geographical distance, then changes in knowledge, and particularly architectural knowledge, become apparent and traceable when addressed in the international setting. We have been able to present the transformation of FGS in detail because the movement of knowledge and people from England to Italy is easily distinguished. Local innovations do move, but while informal spillovers of knowledge may be valuable to the recipient firms, their pathways tend to be obscure and often beyond the reach of researchers.
The model that we have developed focuses on firm level learning, but there are wider implications for the development and transformations of regions. The 'evolutionary turn' in economic geography places innovation and knowledge development as central to the processes of transformation of economic landscapes (Boschma and Martin, 2007) . Maskell and Malmberg (2007) suggest a link between the micro-processes of firm level innovation, selection and retention and evolutionary processes of knowledge creation at the regional level. Maskell (2014) recognizes that local economic systems have always required some degree of outside knowledge input to stay competitive. Our framework has broader implications for the mechanisms by which regions may evolve new knowledge and therefore adapt to changing exogenous landscapes. Economic geography has clearly established the existence of industry clusters, but has limited tools for understanding the mechanisms by which these distinctive locales influence the activities of companies in international industries. We believe that strategic management models offer relevant tools and propose the model development herein as one approach to understanding the relevance of location to strategy and of strategic management to the exploitation of locations. 
